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ICCAS 2020 Lessons learnt from Boeing 737 M …
Lessons learnt from Boeing 737 MAX accidents about
human factor considerations in aircraft design and
certification
Content
Recently two newly certified Boeing 737-8 (MAX) (Lion Air flight JT610 and Ethiopian Airlines
flight ET302) crashed within 4 months resulting in 346 fatalities. The causes of both accidents are
similar: the unintended and repetitive activations of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmenta-
tion System (MCAS), which resulted in repetitive aircraft nose down commands through horizon-
tal stabilizer trim. The crews were not able to resolve the abnormal situation. Flight LNI043 just
preceding the JT610 accident faced a similar situation resolved with major difficulties.
MCAS is a flight law, implemented in Flight Control Computers (FCC), introduced by Boeing in
B737 type definition as part of the modification from NG to MAX and certified under FAA regula-
tions, the resulting amended type certificate being validated by various other aviation authorities.
One common root cause to the 3 events is that pilot’s FCC is fed with erroneous data from left
angle of attack (AoA) sensor, thus triggering MCAS. This led to increased crew workload at low
altitude with 3 simultaneous visual cockpit alerts and a physical alert (stick shaker); an expected
alert (AOA DISAGREE) was not raised because of a design issue whose resolution was ongoing.
During the 2 accident flights, crews were not able to correctly identify the aircraft situation and
take related actions for continued safe flight. It required 3 minutes and 40 seconds to LNI043 crew
to resolve the abnormal situation with the help of an additional crewmember.
Boeing’s assumptions and evaluation methods used for safety assessment of the modified longi-
tudinal control of B737 MAX apparently did not sufficiently consider cockpit effects (workload,
situation awareness) of MCAS unintended activation and its possible causes (e.g. erroneous AoA),
nor the resulting crew actions. They are based on engineering experience and regulatory require-
ments/guidance, complemented by interpretation in the context of successive aircraft modifica-
tions on B737 type.
Through analysis of official reports, our aim is to evaluate, with a safety improvement perspec-
tive, the following underlying human and human-machine interaction factors that may have con-
tributed to those accidents.
- Cockpit situational awareness and pilot recognition of failures, in highly integrated aircraft sys-
tems: helping pilots to diagnose failures and prioritize its actions with quick reaction time and
appropriate understanding of abnormal situation (application of CS/FAR25.1322);
- Assumptions about crew behavior during design and system safety analysis: complexity of full
evaluation of abnormal scenarios based on regulatory guidance and previously validated assump-
tions, emphasized when modifying an existing safety-proven aircraft (consideration of human fac-
tors impacts and training as a related areas in application of 21A.101 - Change Product Rule)
- Decision taking for design choices: design decisions about MCAS could be seen as a “tunnel effect”
with a focus on positive compliance demonstration to prescriptive requirements, and insufficient
design-to-safety considerations possibly aided by low involvement of airworthiness engineers at
appropriate levels;
- Maintenance human factors: as human decisions in maintenance significantly contributed to er-
roneous AoA value in JT610 accident, improvement of troubleshooting and repair to perform an
evaluation of the airworthiness status of integrated aircraft system.
